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I was pleased to see that van de Kaa spelled out my comments on prospect theory and must have 
spent quite some time tracing back the references and conducting some additional qualitative 
research. The very purpose of my contribution to the workshop and the paper was to stimulate 
discussion and it seems to have succeeded in that regard. 
Unfortunately, the result of van de Kaa’s effort is a largely unstructured piece of work that 
touches on many different issues. A detailed response to each point (many qualify for such a 
response) would take many pages and the same unstructured set-up and I have no desire to do 
so as many points would require a detailed contextual expose, justification of interpretations and 
elaboration. This rejoinder therefore addresses the main train of thought. Even after careful re-
reading, however, I have difficulty understanding the precise motivation, tone and intention of 
his reaction. It is clear that he identified mistakes in the references, signaling that these mistakes 
were not filtered out by the database in my group, nor by the reviewers, not by any systems that 
the journal itself may have. I stand corrected – may the reader benefit. 
Beyond that, van de Kaa’s main concern seems to be that “most critical comments in the paper 
appeared to be <my> personal opinions without solid theoretical or empirical support”.  I have 
no need to contend this qualification: the paper is exactly that – nothing more, nothing less! In 
fact, on page 370, 3rd paragraph, I explicitly mentioned the context of the paper: I was invited for 
the workshop that led to the special issue to voice critical comments about prospect theory to 
stimulate the discussion. The criticisms were therefore phrased such as to trigger the audience to 
critically think about the theory and the way it has been applied in travel behavior research to 
date, to provide input to the discussion and/or conduct empirical research (to the extent possible 
as not all arguments lend themselves for empirical research). Illustrative examples were therefore 
also based where possible on research of other attendees. The arguments are not based on any 
thorough historical exegesis of (accumulated) prospect theory and a reconstruction of the 
development of the theory and its (non-)reception in different disciplines. Rather, it is based on 
my personal mental representation of the pros and cons of this theory, developed across decades 
from my days in marketing and consumer science based on earlier discussions in workshops, 
dozens of papers about prospect theory that I processed as editor or conference organizer, and 
independent critical thinking. Considering this nature of the invitation, no attempt was made to 
add nuances or to be comprehensive – it is not a resource paper, not a detailed literature review, 
not a meta analysis. This should sufficiently qualify the comments made in section 3 of van de 
Kaa’s comments and put these into the right context. I fail to see however that the fact the paper 
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expresses personal opinions can be turned into support for the relevance of prospect theory to 
travel choice modeling as the title of van de Kaa’s comments suggests. 
Implicitly, van de Kaa seems to argue that only a detailed historical account, based on solid 
(which is not defined) theoretical or empirical support is academic, and anything else is inferior. 
As this touches upon a methodological discussion and goes beyond the scope of this journal, I 
will not comment on the argument in this rejoinder. Let me suffice to say that I disagree, and that 
it would be counterproductive to reflections about the state of the art and formulating research 
agendas. Again, the paper was not meant to give a summary overview of the balance of evidence 
of empirical support of prospect theory – it was meant to stimulate thinking about its 
(ir)relevance to different aspects of travel behavior research. 
To get some structure behind the loose set of comments on (accumulated) prospect theory and set 
the stage to compare it with econometrically based discrete choice models, I started with a 
conceptual framework that I find useful to position the various models of choice and decision 
making that have been suggested over the years and with a formal underlying representation 
using expected utility theory (expected value model) as a reference. Dominant theories on choice 
behavior such as information integration, probabilistic choice theories, random utility theory, 
decompositional preference theory, satisfaction and evaluation theory and with some 
imagination even various attitudinal theories can all be explained, categorized and discriminated 
in terms of this framework. I considered this useful because it allows the classification of 
alternative theories in terms of objective vs. perceptual representations, linear vs. non-linear 
value judgments, deterministic vs. stochastic value judgments (utility functions) and 
deterministic vs. probabilistic choices: issues that were picked up later on in the paper. Moreover, 
this framework served to position and classify the work on prospect theory in travel behavior 
research, reflecting how scholars in travel behavior research have applied the theory in their 
formalized model specifications. Van de Kaa seems to somehow have misconstrued this part of 
the paper as a discussion of prospect theory in its widest arguments. His reaction also seems to 
indicate that he has been insufficiently aware of modeling assumptions that need to be made and 
their theoretical implications. Consequently, Section 1 of his paper is ill-founded and logically 
therefore his suggestion of fabrication is unwarranted: if there is any fabrication, it stems from 
the fact that van de Kaa is trying to interpret my representation from a not-intended and 
misplaced perspective. As a consequence, rather than becoming involved in a constructive 
discussion to better identify the adequacy of prospect theory relative to competing theories and 
associated modeling approaches, his counter-argument seems to be that prospect theory 
potentially can deal with (almost) every behavioral process (under risk and uncertainty) which 
does not seem a productive stance. 
In order to stimulate the discussion on the boundaries of (accumulated) prospect theory, my 
main point, that runs through the paper, is that activity-travel behavior differs in some 
fundamental ways from gambling and similar types of behavior for which prospect theory has 
been originally advanced/to which it has been predominantly applied: travel behavior 
represents repeated (vs. one time only) choice, it is context-dependent, it often has low 
consequences and moreover any negative consequences can be easily remedied, travellers learn 
(vs. gambling represents pure chance), outcomes and their probabilities are not given and fixed 
(but are mentally construed as part of travellers belief systems and may change over time), 
probabilities are departure and route choices are embedded in daily schedules (as opposed to 
stand-alone choices), it represents a form of routine as opposed to high involvement behavior, 
etc. etc. Because (accumulated) prospect theory does not explicitly include the concepts to 
characterize this very nature and complexity of activity-travel decisions and in its original and 
still dominant form (at least in the derived models) lacks the critical mechanisms and therefore 
the sensitivity to represent the quintessence of activity-travel scheduling decisions in any 
comprehensive way, I emphasized the limitations of prospect theoretical approaches in 
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predicting daily activity-travel patterns. Competing approaches have more to offer in terms of 
content validity in this context! It seems to me that my arguments are more fundamental and go 
much beyond what van de Kaa has read “Yet the only arguments in T that support PT’s 
inferiority for transport research compared to Bayesian learning models concern its inability to 
update references between recurrent choices”. In fact, this is just a minor issue. 
Thus, if we unpeel prospect theory from its wider interpretations that van de Kaa, both in his 
reaction and dissertation, seems to embrace, I argued that what is left is the curvature of the 
model, including the reference points (indeed - in reaction to Section 3.7 - used in a mathematical 
sense only to depict any bifurcation in the value judgment, utility function or choice model 
because different models use different concepts; this can be a single one or multiple ones (one for 
every attribute) as in Zhu and Timmermans). I continued saying that indeed the notion of 
regimes in the value function is interesting and that the actual shape can be empirically tested. 
However, I also emphasized that the curvature itself does not rule out any competing theories of 
choice under uncertainty, and I mentioned some examples of models, admittedly mostly from 
work conducted in my group, that have a similar flavor, but were derived from different 
theories, and are based on a richer, econometric modeling tradition (a secondary line of 
argumentation in the paper is that most work on prospect theory in travel behavior research has 
not made the usual modeling assumptions). Section 3.4 in van de Kaa’s reaction suggests that I 
have not been very successful in communicating this argument to him. Second 3.6 even suggests 
that he seems ignorant of the issues: “A thorough examination of all these articles revealed that 
genuine human error was the best explanation for people’s choice of different alternatives from 
the considered recurrent identical choice sets. PT does not explicitly discuss human error in 
connection with choice”: this was exactly my point as one example why a richer modeling 
approach seems warranted! Whether the resulting models will still be derived from prospect 
theory or some utility theory does not really matter – the multinomial logit model is commonly 
interpreted in terms of random utility theory but can also be and in fact has been derived from 
several other theories. Empirical evidence of the predictive success of the model itself does not 
say much necessarily on the validity of the underlying theory. What I hinted at is that the 
curvature, which van de Kaa argues is the quintessence of prospect theory, can also be derived 
from some competing theories – in the meantime it has been shown in a forthcoming TRB paper 
(Zhang, Yu and Timmermans, 2013) that it can be derived from relative utility theory.   
This difference in perspective continues in section 3.5, which argues that I should have referenced 
his dissertation. This statement assumes that as a member of his committee, I have read every 
single page of his dissertation carefully as opposed as judging whether it globally meets the 
minimum requirements, and that I remember its full contents or checked his dissertation again 
when writing the paper for the workshop. The answer to all these assumptions is negative, but 
more importantly, the argument is not relevant. My comments about shifting reference points do 
not deal with the issue discussed in Section 3.5 of van de Kaa’s comments that “… participants 
received feedback about the outcomes of their previous choices in the sequence respondents 
receive”. In contrast, my argument is an elaboration of the general argument that other theories 
and model are richer in their conceptualization. In particular, it refers to models of dynamic 
activity-travel behavior and associated learning, including our work on learning and dynamic 
aspiration levels, all published long before van de Kaa’s dissertation, which in turn are founded 
in more basic theories.  I can only wonder why the comment is made – upon close reading, the 
two quotes clearly are unrelated and point at different issues. 
Most of van de Kaa’s remaining arguments seem a repeat of his earlier arguments. Once more, 
the contention of my contribution to the workshop as reflected in the paper is that (accumulated) 
prospect theory offers a sound and valuable approach to especially those choice processes in 
travel behavior that are sufficiently congruent with its critical assumptions as it has proven its 
usefulness in several other disciplines: uncertainty, clear gains and losses, simple problems, etc. 
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Examples would be pricing, travel information and the like. The state of the art in applications of 
prospect theory would benefit I argued by improving modeling rigor in these applications as it is 
typically associated with models derived from competing theories. Whether this then is called a 
prospect theoretical model or a relative utility model or just a reference-based model is a non-
issue from a modeling perspective if the purpose is to predict actual choices. However, in case of 
routine departure time and route choice, the question is whether these choice problems meet 
assumptions and reasoning behind prospect theory. Interestingly, Kahneman and Tversky 
themselves in their 1983 APA keynote address argued that “loss aversion effects unlikely play a 
significant role in routine economic exchanges”. Shouldn’t travel be considered as equivalent to 
such routine economic exchanges? Isn’t it simply a cost that people need to pay because they 
have commitments? In any case, I find other models and underlying theories more appealing for 
the development of the new generation of comprehensive models of travel demand, which 
predict how dynamically individuals and households organize their activities and associated 
travel in time and space under conditions of uncertainty, with an abundance of information as 
part of social networks. Ironically, the rare instances where van de Kaa seems to agree with my 
arguments amplify the very quintessence of my main argument and define what I see as the 
boundaries of the relevance of prospect theory to travel demand forecasting and travel behavior 
research.  
 
